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THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: 
PARTICIPATION AND IMPACT IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
DE(REGULATION)1 
 
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss2 
 
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) addressed both pricing 
deregulation and universal service in telecommunications during the last decade. Both 
decisions had a similar cast of characters and similarly elaborate processes. In relation 
to price deregulation, the utilities' positions were accepted on every issue addressed; in 
relation to universal service, consumer organizations’ positions were accepted in about 
60 percent of the issues. This article tells the story of how those decisions were made and 
examines the reasons for the difference in impact. The article examines and rejects an 
explanation of capture, accepts in part a focus on the influence of the commissioner in 
charge of the decision, and suggests that the most important factor in determining impact 
was the perceptions and expectations of CPUC commissioners and staff. This reminds us 
of the importance of agency personal and their profound impact on regulatory results.   
 
                                                 
1 The William & Mary Policy Review Editorial Board would like to thank Professor Reiss for her 
scholarship and her insight. In the interest of providing the most discerning research, the author relied on 
interviews in which participants wished to remain anonymous, even from the Editorial Board. For this 
reason, the Board cannot vouch for the complete accuracy of the quotations.  
2 Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of Law. The author would like to thank 
the participants at the Wake Forest University School of Law Forum on Asymmetry of Administrative Law 
for their comments. The author would also like to thank David Jung, David Levine, Adam Scales, and 
Reuel Schiller, for comments and input into this project, and Annie Daher, Alicia Jovais, Svetlana Matt and 
Jonathan Trunnell for superb research assistance.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Are regulators more likely to heed consumer organizations on purely 
redistributive issues than on more general regulatory issues, even if those more general 
issues may have redistributive consequences?  
This article examines two decisions by the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC). The first decision largely deregulated the California telecommunications market 
in terms of prices, removing most price controls and reporting requirements from the 
incumbent telecommunications carriers, or incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs).3 
The second decision changed several important aspects of the California LifeLine 
Program, the program providing subsidized telecommunications service to low-income 
consumers.   
The article does not try to evaluate the substance of CPUC’s decisions or 
determine whether they were correct or desirable. That is an important project, but it is 
not this one. Rather, this article addresses participation and input into the process. The 
article asks why, in the first case, the CPUC’s decision was in line with the ILECs’ 
preferences on almost every issue, and why, in the second case, it accepted the consumer 
organizations’ preferences on several issues. The article examines three possible 
explanations. First, it examines and rejects the argument that in the first proceeding the 
CPUC was captured by the ILECs. Second, it partly accepts the argument that the 
preferences of the assigned commissioner affected the result, but qualifies it by 
emphasizing the role of the staff. Third, it examines the hypothesis that the type of issue 
was critical to the different results and concludes that this is the most powerful 
explanation. The commission considered the expertise of consumer groups more 
important on the second issue than on the first. Further, the higher level of conflict in the 
first decision meant that the commission pretty much had to choose between positions, 
while on the second decision, it could find a middle point. This suggests that, in these 
cases, regulators’ approaches to input mattered a lot, and regulators saw consumer 
organizations’ input as much more important in areas in which they thought those 
organizations have special expertise.  
                                                 
3 An incumbent local exchange carrier is a company that was in place when AT&T was broken up. A local 
exchange carrier is basically a telecommunications provider. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 §3(44).  
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The article has only two cases studies, and it does not claim they are 
representative of regulatory behavior. Nonetheless, the close inspection of the process 
sheds interesting light on the role of consumer advocates and the role of regulators in the 
process.  
The article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the background of the decisions, 
providing a short description of the CPUC and of each decision, setting out the 
boundaries of the conflict. Part III sets out the process the CPUC used and explains it, 
addressing criticisms of the proceeding. Part IV then describes the “winners” in each 
proceeding and how they are identified. Part V addresses the three explanations for the 
differences as follows: rejecting the capture hypothesis, partly confirming the assigned 
commissioner hypothesis, and accepting the type of issue hypothesis.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) is an unusual agency in that 
it is a constitutional agency. In 1911, the California Senate proposed a constitutional 
amendment giving the newly created Railroad Commission constitutional status; the 
electorate ratified the amendment.4 In 1946, this became the California Public Utilities 
Commission.5 Today, the CPUC regulates multiple areas,6 but this article focuses on its 
regulation of communications, with an emphasis on voice telephony.  
The CPUC’s procedures can be found partly in the California Public Utilities 
Code.7 The CPUC has created additional procedures itself, including classification of 
decisions and assignment of roles.8 Major decisions are handled by a team consisting of 
at least one assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and one commissioner. The ALJs 
are part of the CPUC’s professional staff. Usually, they have substantial expertise and 
                                                 
4 CPUC History & Structure, CALIF. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N., 
www.cpuc.ca.gov/puc/aboutus/puhistory.htm (last visited on May 14, 2012).   
5 Id.  
6 Id. The CPUC also regulates communications, energy, transportation and water. 
7 Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 1 et seq., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/calawquery?codesection=puc. 
Especially important for our purposes are §§ 1701-1710, which govern hearings. 
8 Agencies regularly create regulations that limit their own powers and add accountability mechanisms. 
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Account Me In: Agencies in Quest of Accountability, 19 J. OF L. AND POL’Y 
611(2011); Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859 (2009). The 
Constitution formally gives the commission the power to determine its own procedures on matters not 
settled by statute. California Constitution, Article XII, § 2, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/const-toc.html. 
 William & Mary Policy Review                [Vol. 6:2 
 
 
59 
experience in at least one area of utility matters. They may have a background in law, 
engineering, public policy or other related disciplines. Often, though not always, they 
specialize in the subject matter of the proceeding. One ALJ explained to me that 
expediency and caseload sometimes lead to deviations from expertise; for example, the 
CPUC has a lot more energy matters on its plate these days than communication matters, 
so ALJs with a communications expertise find themselves handling energy cases 
frequently.9 Even when that is the case, however, they draw on one another’s expertise. A 
former ALJ described the ALJs as a very collegial group and explained that they 
regularly consult one another when handling cases that require special expertise.10  
The five commissioners are political appointees, selected for a set term by the 
governor and confirmed by the senate.11 They may have a utilities background,12 and 
naturally, their political leanings factor into their appointments. When discussing the 
different commissioners, interviewees regularly comment on their party (not always 
correctly) and on their background.13  
Both decisions addressed in this article fall into the category of “Quasi-
Legislative” proceedings.14 There are three practical implications of this categorization. 
                                                 
9 Private Communication, ALJ.  
10 Interview, ALJ. For example, he mentioned that there are Certified Public Accountants among the ALJs 
that are regularly consulted on matters requiring knowledge of accounting.  
11 California Constitution, Article XII, § 1, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.const/.article_12. 
12 Of the current commissioners: President Peevey used to work in the energy sector; Commissioner Simon 
was a “a former securities and banking industry attorney involved in financial products and services”; 
Commissioner Florio worked for The Utility Reform Network (TURN) for many years, specializing in 
energy issues; Commissioner Sandoval was an academic researching and writing on telecommunications 
issues; and Commissioner Ferron worked in several different positions in the banking industry. About Us: 
Commissioners, CALIF. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/aboutus/commissioners/ 
(last visited May 14, 2012).  
13 One interview commented that “Commissioner Grueneich was the consumers’ commissioner.” 
Interview, Melissa Kasnitz, Legal Counsel, Center for Accessible Technology, Berkeley, California, March 
7, 2012. Another commented that “Commissioner Chong and Kennedy were appointed by a Republican 
governor.” Interview, Consumer Organization (this comment is mistaken in regards to Ex-Commissioner 
Kennedy – she was appointed by Governor Davis, a Democrat).  
14 Other categories include Adjudicatory and Rate-setting proceedings. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1701.1. See 
also Philip Scott Weismehl, CPUC PROCEDURES 2 (Administrative Law Judge Assistant Chief ed., 2010) 
(hereinafter Weismehl manual) (internal report, on file with author). The CPUC has considerable discretion 
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First, quasi-legislative proceedings are, by definition, commissioner-run.15 In a manual 
prepared to explain to new staff members how the CPUC operates, ALJ Philip Weismehl 
explained that, for these decisions, “responsibility shifts to [the] commissioner with [the] 
ALJ assisting.”16 Second, unlike in rate-setting cases, in these proceedings, the 
assignment of a particular ALJ to the proceeding cannot be challenged. That was not an 
issue in either decision here. Finally, in a rulemaking decision, ex parte communications 
are permitted and do not have to be put on the record, which makes it almost impossible 
to know the extent of lobbying that went on. Even if we could talk to every participant, 
and could assume they were all telling the truth, they may not have a full memory of the 
off-the-record events that are more than six years old. Some of them openly stated that 
they had imperfect memories and recollections of the events. Lobbying is very much the 
norm in these kinds of proceedings. In fact, an interviewee from a consumer organization 
said of her biggest error in relation to the Uniform Regulatory Framework (URF) 
decision: “procedurally, I wish I had known more about the importance of ex parte 
earlier. I don’t think that I lobbied as effectively as I might have simply because I was a 
novice at working in front of the commission.”17 
The two decisions addressed here are, in a sense, two sides of the same coin.18 
Both of them are part of restructuring telecommunications regulation in a mode in which 
prices and services are determined, for the most part, by the market, and the CPUC’s 
involvement focuses on directly protecting social values in areas in which it believes the 
                                                                                                                                                 
in assigning matters to a category and determining whether hearings are required. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 
1701.1.  
15 Cal Pub. Util. Code § 1701.4 (“The assigned administrative law judge shall act as an assistant to the 
assigned commissioner in quasi-legislative cases.”). 
16 Weismehl manual, supra note 14, at 4.  
17 Interview, Member of consumer organization, March 8, 2012.  
18 Telecommunications regulation is an ongoing process, and almost any decision is closely connected to 
many other decisions. This article only focuses on two decisions, acknowledging that by doing so, it is 
presenting a static view of what is a dynamic, ongoing process and inevitably presenting just one step in the 
intricate dance of many stakeholders. However, examining the process of all of them at the level of detail 
done here is extremely resource and time consuming, on one hand, and extremely important on the other: as 
this article demonstrates, there are important insights to be learned from this close analysis of the process 
which cannot be found from an examination of decisions alone.  
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market does not operate well.19 The first decision, the URF, was chosen for two reasons – 
first, it is an extremely important decision, discussing the complete removal of price 
controls from the California telecommunications market. Second, when I started this 
project, the decision was described as a classic case of regulatory capture. Since my 
interest was in capture, it seemed like a perfect case study. I selected the second decision 
because it is the latest decision to address an issue the URF explicitly left unresolved, the 
LifeLine Program. It was close in time and involved the same main actors – sometimes 
the very same people – as the URF decision, but it addressed a different issue and was 
handled by a different commissioner. There are, therefore, some important similarities 
that allow for meaningful comparison – both address telecommunications, both affect 
affordability, especially for vulnerable groups, and both involve the same constellation of 
actors. There are differences in terms of the subject matter and leading commissioner that 
can help explain why the commission came to different conclusions. 
The URF decision is certainly not a routine decision and hence not representative 
of everyday matters in the CPUC. Still, as an important struggle, it can shed light on the 
interaction of interests and influence.  
The Uniform Regulatory Framework decision (URF),20 handed down in August 
2006, radically altered the regulatory framework governing ILECs. In the CPUC’s words, 
the URF decision: 
Grant[s] carriers broad pricing freedoms concerning almost all 
telecommunications services, new telecommunications products, 
bundles of services, promotion, and contracts. We make 
contracts effective when executed, and thereby end the necessity 
of post-signing reviews by this Commission. With few 
                                                 
19 As will be explained, many of the debates surrounding these decisions reflect divergent views of how 
well markets can actually regulate the behavior of the carriers, especially the ILECs, and what the 
appropriate role is for the regulator.  
20 Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission's Own Motion to Assess and Revise the Regulation of 
Telecommunications Utilities (2006), Calif. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, Dec. No. 06-08-030, at 151,  
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/Final_decision/59388.htm (last visited May 1, 2012) (hereinafter The 
URF Decision). 
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restrictions, we permit carriers to add services to “bundles” and 
target services to specific geographic markets.21 
The decision also removed many of the California-specific reporting requirements 
previously imposed on ILECs, bringing those requirements in line with the Federal 
Communications Commission’s (FCC) requirements.22 It removed special accounting 
requirements placed on the utilities, requirements that, in the words of a lawyer working 
for AT&T, “required us to keep three sets of books” (one for the CPUC, one for the FCC, 
and one for the SEC).23 The decision did put in place a price cap on basic residential 
services until 2009 and froze the basic residential service prices for customers living in 
high cost areas that were covered by a special subsidy program.24 In short, the decision 
represented a substantial change in the way incumbent telecommunications carriers were 
regulated. It gave them substantial freedom to set prices and was thus fairly described as 
a big step towards “deregulation” of telecommunications.  
There are two completely divergent views of the decision. Supporters of the 
decision see it as the natural result of the vast technological and structural changes in the 
communications sector. New competitors entered the market. With the rise of alternatives 
to landline telecommunications services, competition in the market increased 
                                                 
21 The URF Decision, supra note 20, at 2.  
22 The URF Decision, supra note 20, at 3 (“We eliminate all monitoring reports tied to the now outdated 
New Regulatory Framework (NRF) governing the incumbent local exchange carriers affected herein. 
Instead, we standardize our reporting requirements so that they are consistent with comprehensive reports 
provided by all carriers to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).”). 
23 Interview, AT&T. The URF Decision, supra note 20, at 3  
 
(“We reduce and eliminate many of the vestiges of rate-of-return regulation, such as 
“accounting adjustments” and other rules that cause regulatory accounts to diverge from 
financial accounts. These regulatory adjustments no longer serve a ratemaking purpose. 
We instead, therefore, base our requirements on Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) accounting standards and FCC accounting rules, and consequently 
streamline our audit practices. We eliminate the price cap index, price cap filings, 
earnings “sharing,” and gain-onsale distributions, all of which are no longer appropriate 
in the competitive voice communications market.”). 
 
24 The URF Decision, supra note 20, at 2. The CHCF-B fund, which provides subsidies to ensure that 
customers living in relatively remote areas would have access to communications services at affordable 
prices, is beyond the scope of this article.  
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dramatically. Mobile, cable, and voice over internet protocol (VoIP) challenged the 
dominance of the traditional landline operators.25 These changes led to a state and 
nationwide move towards reducing command-and-control regulation and relying on the 
market as much as possible, as reflected in statutory change at the state and national 
levels.26 The previous regulation was untenable in the new reality, hobbling competition 
by preventing ILECs from competing and making the whole market inefficient. 
According to proponents of this view, the existing regulatory regime simply did not make 
sense. They argued that it had to be changed, and the CPUC, by enacting the URF 
Decision, simply stepped up to the line and did its job.  
Opponents vehemently disagreed. They saw the decision as an abdication of the 
CPUC’s responsibilities to protect consumers. In their view, the decision sacrificed the 
interests of consumers in general and vulnerable consumers in particular.27 They did not 
agree that the market was competitive because the technological substitutes were not 
available for important segments of the population, such as low income consumers, the 
elderly, disabled consumers, and some rural populations. These consumers have to rely 
on landline as their primary service, and, as opponents argued it, the landline market was 
not competitive because the ILECs dominated that market. Through mergers and 
acquisitions that market had become increasingly consolidated. Claims of competition, 
they say, were based on a partial view of the market, a view focusing on young, well-off, 
savvy consumers with access to technical alternatives, who were able to take advantage 
of promotions offered by the ILECs and their competitors. The ILECs’ market power 
allowed them to mistreat consumers and manipulate the market by removing controls that 
then allowed them to hike prices and harm consumers.28 The CPUC should continue to 
closely regulate the ILECs. If it has to do this horrible thing and remove price controls, it 
must at least keep in place reporting requirements, so that it can catch the inevitable 
                                                 
25 Id. at 4 (“The market is far more competitive. It now includes multiple wireless carriers; competitive 
local exchange carriers (CLECs); cable television companies that have added Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) telecommunications products to yield a “triple play” of voice, video and data offerings; and pure-
play VoIP providers, such as Vonage or Packet8, that will add a voice communications service to any 
broadband connection”.)  (footnotes omitted).  
26 Id. at 32-36. See also CHARLE F. JR PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (Public 
Utilities Reports, Inc. 1993). 
27 Interviewees used very vehement language to describe the decision and express their disagreement. 
28 Interviews, TURN, DisabRA.  
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problems early and respond to them.29 The URF did not even do that; it instead loosened 
reporting requirements. 
The URF decision generated much controversy, discussion, and argument. 
Feelings still run strong about it on both sides. As will be discussed in the next section, 
the parties’ views of the process are strongly affected by their views of the decision. 
Everyone agrees the decision was initiated by the CPUC and driven by a result the CPUC 
thought desirable. However, proponents see the CPUC’s process as open, believe it 
provides multiple opportunities for input, and considers the decision strongly evidence-
based. Opponents see the CPUC as entering the process with its decision already made, 
unwilling to consider the evidence and ignoring the record. I want to reiterate that this 
article is not reexamining the URF decision to see whether the CPUC “got it right.” Its 
focus is on this much-debated process and input. 
The other decision examined here is one in a line of decisions relating to 
California’s LifeLine Program. The decision in question is the one handed down in 
November 2010.30 California’s LifeLine Program is its universal service program, 
providing qualifying low-income consumers with subsidized telecommunications service. 
In at least one sense, LifeLine can be seen as a complement to URF. The justification for 
removing price controls is that for those consumers who still need protection because the 
market will fail to serve them, there are social policy programs protecting them, LifeLine 
being one such program. 
There were many other decisions relating to LifeLine,31 but this is an important 
one. It changed the way the program worked from a preset rate. LifeLine participants 
paid only a maximum amount set by the commission, and the carrier (the 
telecommunications operator) was compensated for the difference from a fund. The 
                                                 
29 As Sir Humphrey said to Jim Hacker in “Yes, Minister”: “If you are going to do this damn silly thing, 
don't do it in this damn silly way.” YES, MINISTER: THE WRITING ON THE WALL (BBC Two 1980).  
30 Rulemaking on the Commission's own Motion to review the telecommunications public policy programs 
(2010) Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n., Nov. No. 10-11-033, 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/FINAL_DECISION/127062.htm (last visited May 1, 2012) 
(hereinafter The LifeLine decision). 
31 A description of the important ones can be found in Appendix B to the LifeLine Decision. Melissa 
Kasnitz, a lawyer representing the interests of disabled customers, sees the 2005 decision (D. 05-04-026) as 
the real problem with the program. The decision was intended to implement the FCC requirements as to 
verification, but the process it adopted was strongly criticized, eventually by the CPUC itself. See Report 
on Strategies to Improve the California LifeLine Certification and Verification Processes (2007). 
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decision changed this to a preset support amount, in which the carrier was given a set 
subsidy for each eligible customer and deducted that amount from its usual rate.32 To 
offer additional protections to consumers, the decision also capped the rate a participating 
carrier may offer at 50 percent of its basic rate, capped this rate for most customers, and 
allowed carriers to change the rate only once a year.33 The decision also allowed carriers 
offering wireless or voice over internet protocol (VoIP) to participate in LifeLine.34 
Finally, it stopped payment to carriers for administrative costs,35 explaining that since 
most regulatory requirements associated with ratemaking had been removed in URF and 
further simplified in this proceeding, there was less justification for reimbursement.36  
In contrast to the URF decision, which completely changed the structure of 
regulation, the parties to this decision were not arguing about the justifications for the 
LifeLine Program itself, about its existence, about its funding or about a complete 
overhaul but only about the details of the program. These were important details, but the 
discussions did not reach the same level of controversy.  
 
III.  PROCEDURES AND PARTICIPATION 
This section examines the process the CPUC used to arrive at both decisions, with 
a focus on the opportunities for the parties – especially consumer groups – to be heard. 
One common criticism of many regulatory processes is that they are structured so that it 
is much easier for regulated entities to have impact and voice than for consumer 
organizations.37 On this issue the article concludes the CPUC process was generally open 
                                                 
32The LifeLine decision, supra note 30, at 3 (determining “that a Specific Support Amount methodology is 
the best option to continue to meet the goals of the Moore Act and our overall universal service goals. Sets 
a Specific Support Amount at 55 percent of the highest basic rate of the State’s URF carriers of last 
resort.”). 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 4. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 85-86. 
37Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices 
Get Heard?, 8 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 245, 259-264 (1998); Jason Yackee Webb & Susan 
Yackee Webb, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 
J. OF POLITICS 128, 133-135 (2006); CORNELIUS M  KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 183  (3d ed., 2003) ("Businesses...are involved in rulemaking more often 
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with multiple opportunities for parties to be heard, and that several extremely capable 
consumer groups took advantage of those opportunities. This is important because there 
is evidence that participation from consumer groups can have substantial impact on 
results,38 and some commentators suggested that the ability of such groups to handle 
technical complexity would be a barrier.39  
The process the CPUC used was elaborate, mostly transparent (with one big 
exception,--ex parte communications), and provided multiple access points and ample 
opportunities for the parties to submit their points of view. Nonetheless, the process of 
one of those decisions – the decision to remove price controls – was strongly criticized by 
consumer groups. Those groups admittedly face a problem, as challenging an agency’s 
decision on substantive grounds is a very hard proposition, and they are unlikely to win 
on a claim that the decision is unreasonable. Challenging the process, therefore, is one 
route to attack what those groups sincerely believe is a wrong result, and it can be a 
strategic step. However, the fact that attacking the CPUC on process has strategic 
advantages does not mean that the groups’ criticisms of the process are insincere. Certain 
aspects of the process generated extremely heartfelt criticisms. The criticisms especially 
focused on the lack of hearings and, more specifically, on the lack of hearings in relation 
to one issue, geographic deaveraging. The CPUC is not required to provide hearings on 
rulemakings, and often has reasons for not doing so, but the groups saw the lack of 
hearings on this issue, and the limited hearings on other issues, as leading directly to a 
lack of an evidentiary record supporting the CPUC’s decision.  
Scholars and policymakers occasionally voice the concern that “public interest 
groups lack the resources to participate in all but a few administrative proceedings and 
are overwhelmed by regulated interests in the proceedings in which they do participate, 
                                                                                                                                                 
than are other groups, and they devote to it greater slices of their likely larger budgets and staffs."); Dorit 
Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. no. 3, 569-610_(2012). But see 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 435-459, 497-99 
(2005) (finding, in three rulemakings, substantial participation by lay people and public interest groups, and 
finding the sophistication of the comments, rather than the identity of the commentator, to determine 
whether they influence the agency's decision). 
38 William D. Berry, An Alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation: The Case of State Public Utility 
Commissions, 28 AM. J. OF POLITICAL SCI. 524, 542-547 (1984). 
39 William T. Gormley, Jr., Policy, Politics, and Public Utility Regulation, 27 AM. J. OF POLITICAL SCI.  86, 
89-90 (1983). 
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leading to a domination of the process by these interests.”40 That is not what I see in 
either of these proceedings; in both proceedings, there was strong and capable 
participation by at least three consumer interest groups of the grassroots variety,41 and the 
Division of Ratepayers Advocate (DRA),42 which can be defined as a proxy-advocacy 
group.43 The DRA, while an “in-house” organization, is tasked with representing 
consumers and is strongly devoted to that goal.44  
In the URF decision, there was evidence of the influence of those groups on the 
procedures. At the request —demand— of DRA and The Utility Reform Network 
(TURN), the commission agreed to hold hearings on the issue of competition: “In URF, 
the commission didn’t see a need for hearing at all. We fought and got a hearing.”45 “At 
the same time, consumer organizations felt that the final decision downplayed their 
concerns and the evidence they brought.46 
In the second decision, there was clear evidence of the influence of those groups 
on the final result, as described in Table 4 in Section III.  
                                                 
40 Symposium, The Asymmetry of Administrative Law, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.(2012).  
41 Gormley defines grass-roots as “private organizations that promote interests unrelated to their members’ 
occupation.” Gormley, supra note 39, at 87. Representatives of at least three consumer organizations 
participated in this proceeding: The Utility Reform Network, TURN, http://www.turn.org (hereinafter: 
TURN); Disability Rights Advocate (DisabRA), http://www.dralegal.org; and Greenlining, 
http://greenlining.org/index.php.   
42 The Division of Ratepayers Advocate is an in-house consumer watchdog. It is a branch of the CPUC 
whose mission is “to obtain the lowest possible rate for service consistent with reliable and safe service 
levels.” Division of Ratepayers Advocate, DRA.CA.GOV, http://www.dra.ca.gov/default.aspx (last visited 
May 1, 2012). The few empirical studies examining this kind of representation found it effective, at least on 
some issues. William T. Gormley, Jr., Alternative Models of the Regulatory Process: Public Utility 
Regulation in the States, 35 WESTERN POLITICAL Q. 297 (1982). 
43 Gormley defines proxy-advocacy groups as “government organizations that represent residents of a  
particular jurisdiction in another government organization’s proceeding.” Gormley, supra note 39, at 87. 
The DRA is part of the CPUC, but its independence is protected. Id.  
44 My interviews with DRA and others strongly suggest they see more eye-to-eye with each other—at least 
in the two telecommunications decisions covered in this paper—than with the rest of the commission or the 
telecommunications carriers, whether ILECs or CLECs. 
45 Interview, TURN. This will be elaborated on below. 
46 Interviews TURN, DisabRA.  
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The next two tables summarize the formal process, excluding ex parte 
communications, which are discussed separately afterwards. This is a list of the 
opportunities to participate, but all of the parties I spoke to report taking advantage of 
these opportunities, and in addition, engaged in extensive ex parte communications with 
the CPUC: 
 
Table 1: Opportunities to Participate in the URF Decision, by Date: 
Date Event 
April 14, 2005 Order Instituting Rulemaking (OIR) issued by CPUC.   
June 3, 2005 One-day workshop on procedural issues. 
June 27, 2005 En banc informational hearing on procedural issues (specifically 
the structure of the OIR). 
August 31, 2005 Parties filed opening comments re: OIR. 
September 2, 2005 Parties filed reply comments re: OIR. 
September 20-22, 
2005 
Three-day workshop in which the parties presented their 
proposals.  Contained question and answer sessions. 
October 31, 2005 DRA submitted a matrix comparing the proposals of the 
different parties (various parties met to generate this document, 
and all parties endorsed it).  
December 16, 2005 CPUC issued a ruling setting dates for evidentiary hearing for 
late January 2006.   
January 30-
February 2, 2006 
Four-day evidentiary hearing regarding market competition. 
March 6, 2006 Parties filed opening briefs on topics addressed so far in the 
proceeding.  The central focus was competition. 
March 24, 2006 Parties filed reply briefs. 
July 25, 2006 Proposed decision of Commissioner Chong. 
August 15-22, 2006 Parties filed comments on proposed decision. 
August 24, 2006 Final decision issued by CPUC. 
 
Table 2: Opportunities to Participate in the LifeLine Decision, by Date: 
Date Event 
March 25, 2006  Order Instituting Rulemaking (OIR) issued by CPUC.   
 William & Mary Policy Review                [Vol. 6:2 
 
 
69 
July 20, 2006  ALJ Bushey’s ruling scheduling public participating hearings.  
July 28, 2006  Opening comments. 
July 31-August 4, 
2006 
Submission of opening comments.  
August 11, 2006  Deadline for Verizon and AT&T (California) to file and serve to 
all of the parties a summary of the “Affordability of Telephone 
Services – A Survey of Customers and Non-Customers” (Field 
Research Corporation, 2004). 
September 14-15, 
2006  
Reply comments filed. 
September 15, 
2006  
Deadline for carriers to notify their customers about hearings. 
September 25, 
2006  
Public participation hearing.  
October 26, 2006  Public participating hearing. 
November 3, 2006  Public participating hearing.  
August 15 - 
September 7, 2007 
Comments filed re: LifeLine Program questions as stated in the 
scoping memo 
September 7 - 28, 
2007 
Reply comments filed.  
May 12, 2008 Proposed decision.   
June 1-9, 2008 Comments filed in response to proposed decision.   
September 19, 
2008  
Ruling by ALJ to Reopen the Record in Light of Transition Plan 
for Basic Local Service Rates 
October 1-3, 2008 Comments filed.  
October 8-16, 
2008 
Reply comments filed.  
October 8, 2008 DRA & TURN file motion for public notice and input and stay on 
the lifeline increase.  
October 23, 2008 Responses filed to DRA & TURN’s motion.  
March 6, 2009  Workshop to provide an opportunity for clarification regarding 
numerical representations in the Proposed Decision prior to 
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submitting comments and replies. 
May 10, 2010  Scoping ruling.  
May 28, 2010 Opening comments on scoping ruling.  
June 18, 2010  Reply comments.  
August 16, 2010  Motion by TURN for the clarification of treatment of lifeline 
rates.  
August 31, 2010  Responses filed to TURN’s motion. 
September 10, 
2010  
Reply filed by TURN to responses to TURN’s motion.  
September 28, 
2010 
Revised proposed decision.  
October 18, 2010  Opening comments.  
October 25, 2010  Reply comments.  
December 22, 
2010  
Rehearing request filed by TURN and others.  
January 6, 2011  Responses to TURN’s application for rehearing.  
February 22, 2011  Another proposed decision.  
March 14, 2011  Comments on proposed decision. 
March 21, 2011 Reply comments.  
 
 A.  EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS  
These tables do not reflect the informal, behind the scenes contacts referred to in 
official parlance as ex parte communications and unofficially by many of the parties as 
lobbying. As already mentioned, the rulemakings were characterized by substantial 
amounts of lobbying of decision makers. These contacts are completely legal in a CPUC 
rulemaking, and there is no requirement that such contacts be recorded. Six years after 
the first decision and two years after the second decision, none of the parties I spoke to 
actually had details of who they met and when. I was told—pretty much by everyone—
that they lobbied intensively. The lobbying focused on the commissioners and their 
policy advisors (referred to as “the fifth floor”), and several parties pointed out that the 
norm is not to lobby the ALJ. I cannot say how often each party got to express its views 
in addition to the formal process, except to say that parties described getting to do so “a 
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lot,” and that both consumer organizations and carriers took advantage of these 
opportunities.  
Two points deserve special emphasis. These opportunities for face-to-face, 
unrecorded meetings were in addition to the many opportunities for above ground input 
from everyone, and there is no indication that new things were said in those meetings – 
just that those meetings could make things already said more memorable and convincing. 
Furthermore, the parties’ positions were consistent throughout the process in both 
decisions and well known to all. Lobbying was important but did not mean, in this case, 
that any party did not get a chance to respond to anyone else’s arguments. 
B.  CRITICISMS OF THE PROCESS 
In terms of the formal process, in both decisions, the CPUC provided ample 
opportunities for the parties to express their positions, at least in writing. There were 
several rounds of briefs, decision drafts and opportunities to respond and comment in 
both decisions. Both decisions also included workshops in which the parties met and got 
a chance to discuss their positions.  
However, the impressions of participants on the dialogue differed between the 
two decisions. Participants describe the URF proceeding as “adversarial.”47 Most of the 
parties said there was not really dialogue or negotiation between stakeholders, and there 
was not really an attempt to settle differences because there was very little common 
ground--the CPUC had a clear position going in.48 In the LifeLine decision, there were 
discussions and dialogues, and parties mentioned many negotiations and back and forth.49  
Most of the criticisms of the process were raised in the context of the URF 
decision and are intimately connected to a party’s view of the result. As already 
explained, a procedural argument may have a better chance of success in a challenge 
against an administrative decision, since courts may hesitate to replace the agency’s 
expertise with its own,50 but courts know procedures.51 Especially against the CPUC, the 
                                                 
47 Interview, CLEC. 
48 Interviews, AT&T, TURN, DisabRA.  
49 Id.  
50 See, e.g., Nicholas J. Leddy, Determining Due Deference: Examining When Courts Should Defer to 
Agency Use of Presidential Signing Statements, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 869 (2007); Reuel E. Schiller, The Era 
of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of the New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. 
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court is hesitant to challenge the agency’s substantive decisions. Criticisms centered on at 
least three issues. First, some parties felt there were insufficient evidentiary hearings. 
Second, there was criticism of the decision to include geographic deaveraging in the final 
decision. Third, some parties argued the decision generally ignored the record and the 
parties’ evidence. I address each in turn. 
1. Hearings 
While everyone acknowledged that the CPUC provided multiple opportunities to 
submit written materials, the situation is somewhat different for evidentiary hearings. At 
least in the case of URF, several parties believed that the commission did not provide 
sufficient hearings.  
Subject to judicial review, the CPUC is not actually required to provide 
hearings,52 and they are pretty unusual in rulemakings.53 Interviewees noted that the 
tendency over the years had been to decrease oral hearings, though the interpretation of 
that tendency varied according to the speaker’s point of view, from positive to neutral. 
Positive views connected this reduction of hearings to an increase in efficiency:  
[I]n the last half dozen years or so there has definitely been a bit 
of a change to be more efficient in hearings and to make sure that 
hearings are really used to resolve factual issues rather than to 
make policy arguments or to present witnesses who provide an 
additional method of arguing legal issues. I think that’s an 
appropriate shift in efficiency.54 
Other interviewees explained that the tendency to move away from hearings was 
especially strong in rulemakings and connected it to the requirement that commissioners 
be present when there is a hearing on a rulemaking.55 Commissioners do not want to 
                                                                                                                                                 
REV. 399 (2007); David C. Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-inflicted Wound or the Product 
of a Wounded Agency? A Response to Professor O'Reilly, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 981 (2008). 
51 See generally SIMON HALLIDAY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COMPLIANCE WITH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Hart 
Publishing. 2004). 
52 Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1701.1 (“The commission, consistent with due process, public policy, and 
statutory requirements, shall determine whether a proceeding requires a hearing.”). 
53 Interview, TURN; Interview, CPUC.  
54 Interview, CLEC.  
55 Interview, CPUC  
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spend their time in a hearing room, so they would rather not have hearings on a 
rulemaking if they are required to preside over them.56  
In contrast, other interviewees saw it as a move away from due process, and a 
move that prevented issues from being sufficiently discussed and analyzed.57 For 
example, one interviewee explained: 
You can see this as either more and more subtle and smarter, or 
sloppier and sloppier, accepting processes like that. I see it the 
latter way. There is no one there who is really keeper of flame on 
what due process looks like. The ALJs care, but the 
commissioners dominate.58 
As this quote demonstrates, interviewees traced this to the increasing influence of 
commissioners over proceedings as opposed to ALJs. They explained, “ALJs really value 
a fact-based record and want to decide on it. Commissioners have ideologies. They’re 
political appointees.”59  
In the specific context of the URF, several interviewees criticized the hearings. 
Criticism targeted two aspects: the brevity of the hearings on competition and the lack of 
hearings on other issues. In their brief, Cox, a competitor, criticized the commission on 
this issue, explaining that “competition issues were addressed in only ‘four short days of 
hearings’ and gave the commission ‘minimal insights into the state of competition.’” Cox 
argued that the "limited and rushed nature of the hearings did now allow for any realistic 
analysis to take place." They also noted that Dr. Debra J. Aron filed 200 pages of "dense 
written testimony," but the parties got only two hours to cross-examine. Cox was allotted 
less than fifteen minutes. They criticized the "severely limited scope" of the hearings.”60 
Similar, and even harsher, criticisms were raised by consumer organizations on 
this issue.  
The existing regulatory framework was developed following 
extensive consideration, over sixty days of evidentiary hearings, 
                                                 
56 Interview, CLEC 
57 Interview TURN; interview DRA.  
58 Interview, TURN.  
59 Interview, TURN. 
60 Reply Brief of Cox at 4, Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion to Assess and 
Revise the Regulation of the Telecommunications Utilities, No. R. 05-04-005 (April 7, 2005). 
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examining the issues raised by a complete overhaul of the 
regulatory regime, 13 public participation hearings and numerous 
rounds of comments and briefing. This may be evidence of some 
level of regulatory inefficiency, but it is also indicative of the 
fact that the Commission's responsibilities under the P.U. Code 
are important and complex and require a great deal of effort to 
implement. TURN does not advocate sixty days of hearings. 
However, in this proceeding, the Commission is attempting to 
revamp its entire regulatory scheme based on two rounds of 
comments and a very short set of evidentiary hearings addressing 
only one issue, and taking place in such a limited period of time 
that parties did not have an opportunity to fully cross-examine 
witnesses.61 
Interviewees echo this opinion: “In URF the Commission didn’t see a need for a 
hearing at all. We fought, and got hearings, but they were truncated, not 
evidentiary hearing.”62 
The extensive and lengthy process held before the passage of the New Regulatory 
Framework63 seemed to be part of the reason the CPUC was reluctant to add hearings, but 
TURN pointed out that having too much in case A should not automatically lead to too 
little in case B:  
There were four days of hearings and the utilities put up their 
witnesses, and they have witnesses that have been talking about 
this stuff for years [Harris], saying same stuff for years, saying 
that there is almost competition, and so on, but there was not 
enough time in the hearing room. They only allowed 3-4 days, 
not because the Judge [i.e. ALJ Reed] didn’t want to give time, 
because the assigned commissioner wanted to race the thing 
                                                 
61 Opening Brief of The Utility Reform Network (TURN) at 5, Order Instituting Rulemaking on the 
Commission’s Own Motion to Assess and Revise the Regulation of the Telecommunications Utilities, No. 
R. 05-04-005 (April 7, 2005) (on file with author) (hereinafter Opening Brief, TURN).  
62 Interview, TURN.  
63 Decisions D. 88-08-059, Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 33 
CPUC.2d 43 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Oct. 12, 1989) (hereinafter the New Regulatory Framework or NRF).  
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too… they didn’t allocate enough hearing time – there was a big 
push to get it out as soon as possible.64 
The second criticism was the lack of hearings on other issues, especially 
geographic deaveraging. On the lack of hearing for geographic deaveraging, TURN, for 
example, said in their brief, “the very limited hearings in this proceeding did not address 
the issue.”65 Other interviewees also highlighted the lack of hearings.66Similarly, DRA 
said in its briefs that the proposals for geographic deaveraging “were not previously 
subject to comment, testimony, or vetting in the hearing process.”67  
2. Geographic Deaveraging 
Several of the parties argued that the CPUC did not raise the issue of geographic 
deaveraging enough in the procedure and did not sufficiently develop it in the record. 
Lack of notice claims focused on two issues -- whether geographic deaveraging was 
properly within the scope of the proceeding, and whether parties had been notified 
sufficiently early of its inclusion. Criticisms of the record focused on the lack of a hearing 
on the topic and said that on the minimal record available, the CPUC was prevented from 
deciding on geographic deaveraging. In an application for rehearing, DRA and TURN 
said: 
…the Commission failed to follow its own rules and did not 
provide proper notice to the parties that geographic deaveraging 
was an issue in the proceeding. In particular, the Commission did 
not raise and no party proposed in its comments the possibility of 
allowing geographically deaveraged rate increases. As a result, 
the parties did not have the proper opportunity to be heard on this 
issue: they submitted comments and testimony, and conducted 
                                                 
64 Interview, DRA.  
65 Reply Brief of The Utility Reform Network (TURN) at 42, Order Instituting Rulemaking on the 
Commission’s Own Motion to Assess and Revise the Regulation of the Telecommunications Utilities, No. 
R. 05-04-005 (April 7, 2005) (on file with author) (hereinafter Reply Brief, TURN). 
66 Interview, DRA; interviews, other consumer organizations.  
67 Reply Brief of the Division of Rate Payer Advocates (Redacted Version) at 24, Order Instituting 
Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion to Assess and Revise the Regulation of the 
Telecommunications Utilities, No. R.05-04-005 (April 7, 2005) (on file with author) (hereinafter Reply 
Brief, DRA). 
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cross-examination, based on proposals that did not include 
elimination of geographically averaged price ceilings.68 
There was no independent hearing on this topic. Parties disagreed on whether 
there should have been.69  
In terms of the issue’s inclusion in the scoping memo, views diverged sharply. 
DRA and TURN said, in their application for rehearing, that 
Commission rules require that the proceeding’s scoping memo 
specify the issues to be considered. Due process also requires 
that parties to a proceeding receive proper notice of what matters 
are at issue in a proceeding and an opportunity to be heard on 
those matters. The Commission violated its own rules by failing 
to include the elimination of the geographic averaging 
requirement in the scoping memo and thus deprived the parties 
of the requisite notice and opportunity to be heard.70 
The scoping memo said:  
Is there a uniform regulatory framework that can be applied to all 
providers of regulated intrastate telecommunications services? If 
so, every element of the uniform regulatory framework should be 
identified and described in detail. Any party that recommends a 
specific framework should provide adequate information for the 
Commission to implement the framework. 
And the CPUC officials interpreted this as including any aspect of 
communications regulation, including geographic deaveraging, as long as the parties 
raised it in comments, which I address below.71  
The question of whether there was proper notice was also hotly debated. DRA 
said:  
                                                 
68 Application for Rehearing, Division of Rate Payer Advocates and The Utility Reform Network at 3, 
Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion to Assess and Revise the Regulation of 
the Telecommunications Utilities, No. R. 05-04-005 (September 29, 2006) (on file with author) (hereinafter 
Application for Rehearing). 
69 Interviews DRA, TURN, Cox thought there should have been independent hearings; interviews with 
AT&T, CPUC thought there was plenty of opportunity for input on the topic.  
70 Application for Rehearing, supra note 68, at 3. 
71 Interview, CPUC.  
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… the ILECs’ failure to propose upward geographic deaveraging 
creates a potential legal infirmity in the decision resulting from 
this proceeding if the CPUC adopts the ILECs’ proposal without 
further hearing. Indeed, since upward geographic deaveraging is 
now part of the ILECs’ competition analysis and proposal, DRA 
argues that it should have been proffered much earlier in the 
proceeding. By proposing this element so late in the game, the 
ILECs have prevented other parties from responding to that 
proposal in the hearing phase, which was specifically designed to 
address competition analyses. In essence, DRA sees a due 
process problem if the CPUC adopts the ILECs’ upward 
geographic deaveraging proposal without allowing other parties 
the opportunity to address this element in hearings.72 
TURN challenged the CPUC on this very issue before the Court of Appeals.73 The 
Court of Appeals, however, had discretion whether to take cases involving the CPUC, 
and declined to take this one.74  
The issue of geographic deaveraging was included in the matrix prepared by DRA 
after the September workshop,75 a matrix endorsed by all the parties but not officially 
included in the record.76 This suggests that at least by October 2005, the issue was on the 
table. Several parties commented on it. For example, Cox objected in their brief to 
allowing the ILECs to geographically deaverage up or down, expressing concern about 
                                                 
72 Application for Rehearing, supra note 68, at n.58.  
73 California Courts, “Appellate Courts Case Information: The Utility Reform Network v. Public Utilities 
Comm.,” available at:  
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/disposition.cfm?dist=1&doc_id=369331&doc_no=A116
460 and last accessed on November 1, 2015.  
74 Id. In an interview, a participant explained: “Previously, appeals went to the Supreme Court, and then 
you could never get your case heard. Now they go to the Court of Appeals, so you can get your case heard 
once in a long while.” See Interview, CLEC.  
75 Comparison of Proposals Prepared by Division of Ratepayers Advocate, Order Instituting Rulemaking on 
the Commission’s Own Motion to Assess and Revise the Regulation of the Telecommunications Utilities, 
No. R. 05-04-005 (April 7, 2005) (on file with author) 
76 Interview, DRA. 
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potential predatory behavior by the ILECs. In August 2006—late in the process—DRA 
said, on this issue, when commenting on the Proposed Decision: 
The huge rural rate hikes that would follow from the PD’s 
combining of geographic deaveraging and a high implicit price 
floor almost certainly would violate a federal requirement that 
rural rates for telecommunications and information services must 
be reasonably comparable to urban rates for similar services.77 
It also said that: 
The PD does not cite any record evidence presented in the 
context of geographic deaveraging to support its adoption of a 
major change to the pricing rules (upward geographic 
deaveraging) that was not explored in the hearings on 
competition. That is because the first mention of geographic 
deaveraging as the PD proposes it appeared in the opening briefs 
of some parties. Hence, granting unfettered geographic 
deaveraging would violate Rule 1.2.78 
TURN said: 
The 'record' on deaveraging in this proceeding, including all 
comments, briefs and workshop transcripts amounts to perhaps 5 
double spaced pages, if that. The Commission has taken no 
evidence on the effects of deaveraging on rural communities and 
has not investigated the potential magnitude of price increases or 
the effect on the economies of the affected counties. The 
Commission has not undertaken to review data on the income 
levels of residential and business customers who would be 
affected by deaveraging. The Commission has no information 
about the impact of rate increases for telecommunications 
facilities used by local and county governments, including 
schools, hospitals, medical clinics, tribes, or monitoring water 
and sewage treatment facilities. In the absence of such 
                                                 
77 Comments of the Division of Ratepayer Advocates on the Proposed Decision of Commissioner Rachelle 
Chong at 2, Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion to Assess and Revise the 
Regulation of the Telecommunications Utilities, No. R. 05-04-005 (April 7, 2005) (on file with author).  
78 Id. at 19.  
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information, it is difficult to comprehend how issuing the ILECs 
a blank check constitutes ensuring that rates are just and 
reasonable.79 
In short, whether geographic deaveraging was appropriately covered by the 
proceeding was debated. When asked about this issue, a CPUC official explained:  
Commissioner Chong was fully briefed on the issue, including 
the fact that geographic deaveraging would be controversial. 
Geographic deaveraging, because of its controversial nature, 
provided a clear political marker that we were about change. 
Chong wanted the fight... 
For several decades, long distance companies had charged the 
same per minute rates no matter where the long distance calls 
went, despite the fact that states and parts of states varied 
substantially in access charges, the major cost component of a 
long distance call. This national experience suggested that there 
would not be major changes or a rush to deaveraged [sic] rates, 
particularly in light of the limitations on phone companies [sic] 
billing systems. The long distance companies had the best billing 
capabilities, and if they did not think it made sense to do it, it 
was hard to imagine that local companies could or would 
deaverage. 
Since we did not think that geographic deaveraging would occur, 
if we lost this symbolic fight, that would be the extent of the loss. 
There would not be a real world outcome.80 
3. Drawing on the Record 
Several parties strongly felt the CPUC decision was not based on the record and 
ignored their evidence. For example: 
The biggest issue with the URF decision was that they didn’t 
look at the record properly. They had an outcome they wanted to 
reach regardless of the evidence before it. They just [the] made 
                                                 
79 Reply Brief, TURN, supra note 65, at 44.  
80 Email from CPUC official provided under promise of confidentiality (part of sentence omitted to protect 
the sender’s anonymity), received on May 9, 2012, on file with author.  
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decision they wanted (to have less regulation). TURN strongly 
felt like they didn’t have the record to support that.81 
Another consumer representative said: 
The main problem with the decision was that it went completely 
counter to evidence. There was no evidence on real competition 
and even the industry advisors admitted there was none in the 
disabled market.82  
The parties clearly disagreed on interpreting the evidence submitted and on the 
validity of CPUC’s conclusion. What is clear is that the decision took seriously the 
parties’ submissions, reflected their positions correctly, and referenced the record 
extensively. It heavily cited the parties’ briefs and mentioned evidence relied on. Most 
parts of the decision are devoted to describing the parties’ positions. For example, pages 
53-116 of the URF Decision are devoted to describing the parties’ positions on issues 
related to competition (what is the relevant market, who has market power, and the level 
of competition) and includes a short explanation of why the CPUC decided as it did, 
given the parties’ submissions.   
As explained in the next section, the CPUC did accept the ILEC’s positions on 
most of the issues. For example, on the issue of market power, the CPUC said, “Verizon 
takes the most direct approach in analyzing its case.”83 The CPUC then detailed 
Verizon’s analysis using such phrases as “Verizon detailed,” “Verizon demonstrated,” 
“Verizon reviewed,” and “Verizon documented,” all of which suggest that Verizon was 
very influential on the CPUC’s conclusion regarding market power.84 Similarly, other 
language in this section of the opinion also suggests Verizon’s influence on the CPUC: 
“Verizon appropriately began by. . .”; “Verizon also successfully demonstrated. . .”; 
“Verizon produced evidence that. . ..”85 Much of this language illustrates that the CPUC 
relied heavily not only on Verizon’s arguments but on the empirical evidence it presented 
as well. For example, “Verizon provided survey data that. . .  Verizon established that. . . 
”86; “Verizon’s evidence, especially when coupled with data produced by AT&T 
                                                 
81 Interview, TURN.  
82 Interview with Melissa Kasnitz, Disability Rights Lawyer, Berkeley, California, March 7, 2012.  
83 URF Decision, supra note 20, at 107. 
84 See generally, URF Decision, supra note 20. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 103.  
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(reviewed below), convincingly establishes that a competitive threat is offered by the new 
VoIP technologies. . . Verizon confirmed that. . . Verizon verified that. . .  Verizon 
demonstrated that. . . Verizon documented that. . . ”87.  The CPUC concluded: “In 
summary, Verizon has developed a record in this proceeding that demonstrates that 
policy, technology, and market developments prevent it from exercising market power in 
its California service territories.”88 
The opinion also stated, “AT&T’s showing likewise demonstrated that policy and 
technology limit its market power.”89 As with Verizon, the CPUC relied on evidence 
presented by AT&T in reaching its conclusion. 90 
But while the decision did not mention all the evidence submitted—and the 
volume of submissions by the parties prevented it from doing so—it did not ignore 
evidence contrary to its conclusion. For example, on the same issue mentioned above, the 
CPUC stated that it was not persuaded by the analyses of the other parties.91 The CPUC 
stated: “These contrary arguments are not supported by the weight of the substantial 
record evidence, including the evidence that these parties themselves marshaled,”92 and 
explained at length why it was not persuaded by these arguments,93 at times relying on 
evidence provided by Verizon:94 “We find that the testimony of Aron, Verizon’s witness, 
convincingly demonstrated that VoIP has tremendous growth potential. . .”. 95 
One of my interviewees from the CPUC described Dr. Aron’s testimony as the 
“most factual”, in his view.96    
The CPUC clearly had a point of view going into the proceeding.97 But it did 
address the parties’ submissions. Again, one can legitimately disagree with its 
                                                 
87 Id. at 119. 
88 Id. at, 121.  
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 113-121.  
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 113-114, 118-119.  
96 Interview, CPUC.  
97 See infra Part IV. A subsequent article will address the effects of a pre-existing point of view of an 
agency.  
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conclusions (and it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess those conclusions), but that 
is not the same as saying they ignored the parties’ evidence.  
 
IV. WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE PROCESS 
For the purpose of this section, I compared the initial position of parties—in their 
briefs but also in the excellent summary of positions prepared by the DRA, a document 
accepted by the parties—to the CPUC’s decision. I also looked for language in the 
decision that suggested that a party’s position was accepted. For example, in the URF 
decision, the CPUC explained, in relation to the market definition, that “Verizon’s logical 
analysis provides the Commission with a sensible guide for examining the California 
voice communications marketplace. Applying this systematic analysis, it is clear that the 
relevant market encompasses telecommunications broadly. Market participants include 
CLECs, cable companies, VoIP, and wireless service providers… The evidence provided 
by Verizon on the changing pattern of telecommunications use in California... suggests 
that landline and mobile services are substitutes, and not mere complements.”98 This 
would suggest that, on this issue, Verizon is a “winner.”  
What this methodology does not do is provide a causal analysis on each issue. I 
am not claiming that the CPUC adopted a certain position necessarily because of a 
stakeholder’s input. Sometimes, I have pretty strong evidence supporting impact, for 
example, the language quoted above from the URF decision, and in those cases I 
mentioned that and treated it seriously. Similarly, when it comes to the LifeLine decision, 
on the question of whether to use a set price for LifeLine subscribers or a set support 
amount, the CPUC said that AT&T: 
provided the most comprehensive proposal for the Specific 
Support concept, which AT&T calls a ‘fixed benefit’ . . . AT&T 
proposed that the Commission set a fixed benefit amount 
structured to meet the needs of low-income customers, which 
would be credited on the customer’s bill. Providers would seek 
reimbursement for the fixed amount from the claims process. Such 
an approach would simplify administration of the California 
LifeLine program because the reimbursement amount would no 
longer be calculated based on the provider’s usual rate but rather 
                                                 
98 The URF decision, supra note 20, at 67-68. 
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would be limited to the actual benefit distributed to customers. As 
explained more fully below, we adopt this option for setting the 
California LifeLine subsidy, with some modifications to only 
permit carriers to update their LifeLine rate once a year and to cap 
each carrier’s LifeLine rate at 50 percent of its basic rate.99  
Similarly, in its intervener compensation decisions, the CPUC explicitly credited 
DisabRA for its decision to cap the LifeLine rate for two years.100 
However, as developed below, there is also good evidence that the parties’ stated 
positions were not the only, or possibly even the main, influence on the decision. 
Therefore, the data below demonstrate winners, but a more nuanced discussion of impact 
and why the parties who won, won, will be in the next section.  
 
Table 3: Whose Position “Won” in the URF Decision 
Issue Whose position matched the final 
decision? 
Removing price controls business  AT&T, Frontier and SureWest  
Level of competition in the market  Verizon & AT&T  
Geographic deaveraging  Verizon & AT&T  
Basic residential rate  Verizon & AT&T  
Bundling and promotion constraints`  Verizon & AT&T (mostly)  
                                                 
99 The LifeLine Decision, supra note 30, at 43. 
100 The commission has a program to provide compensation for non-profit organizations when they make a 
substantial contribution to the proceeding (Intervenor Compensation Program Guide and Instructions, 
California Public Utilities Commission, Revised May 2014, Available at: 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/A0BD21F9-7644-477E-94F4-
85B504D43F66/0/UpdatedIntervenorCompensationProgramGuide.pdf, last visited October 29, 2015). In 
this case, the commission compensated DisabRA, TURN and Greenlining. The relevant Intervener 
Compensation for DisabRA is: Decision Awarding Intervenor Compensation To Disability Rights 
Advocates For Substantial Contribution To Decisions 10-11-033 And 08-06-020, Jul. 2011, Decision No 
11-07-024 (copy on file with author). For TURN the decision is: Decision Awarding Intervenor 
Compensation To The Utility Reform Network For Substantial Contribution To Decisions 10-11-033 And 
08-06-020, Jul. 2011, Decision No 11-07-023 (copy on file with author). For Greenlining: Decision 
Awarding Intervenor Compensation To The Greenlining Institute For Substantial Contribution To Decision 
10-11-033, Apr. 2011, Decision No 11-04-029 (copy on file with author). 
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Grandfathering and withdrawal  Mixed: Verizon, AT&T and 
Greenlining  
Monitoring, Auditing and Reporting requirements  AT&T, Verizon, SureWest and 
Frontier  
Gain and Loss from Sale of property  Verizon, AT&T  
Earning Sharing Mechanisms  AT&T, Verizon, SureWest and 
Frontier 
 
Table 4: Whose Position “Won” in the LifeLine Decision? 
Issue Whose position matched the final 
decision? 
Form of subsidy  AT&T, Frontier, Cox, Sprint 
Nextel and T-Mobile  
Freeze & Cap rate  TURN, DisabRA, Greenlining  
How often can carriers change rate?  TURN, DisabRA, Greenlining 
Affordability & Affordability study  Partly TURN, DisabRA, 
Greenlining 
Reimbursing administrative cost and bad debt  TURN, DisabRA, Greenlining 
Bill transparency  Partly TURN, DisabRA, 
Greenlining 
Expanded Eligibility  Verizon and other carriers; nod to 
consumer organizations  
Consumer Education  Partly TURN, DisabRA, 
Greenlining 
Including Wireless?  AT&T, Greenlining, Cox, Sprint 
Nextel, T-Mobile  
 
V. EXPLAINING THE DIFFERING RESULTS 
This Part will explain the difference between the two proceedings – specifically, 
why consumer organizations seemed to have substantially more success in getting their 
positions accepted in the LifeLine decision than in relation to URF. It considers three 
explanations: first, that the CPUC – either the commissioners or the Communications 
Division – were captured by the utilities in the URF decision and in sections of the 
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LifeLine decision, and whether the decision was a result of undue influence by some of 
the stakeholders; second, that it was the commissioner in charge who determined the 
result; and third, that the filter of the CPUC’s perceptions and expectations was 
determinative – that the input of the parties had more influence when the CPUC expected 
it to be of value, and when its initial position was closer to the party’s views. 
The article suggests that this was not capture, and that although the role of the 
commissioner in charge cannot be discounted, the main determinative factor was the 
agency’s expectation and perceptions. This fits in with research that highlights the 
importance of an agency’s preferences101 and the autonomy agencies enjoy.102  
A.  CAPTURE 
There are several definitions of capture. Under one, industry members “persuade 
regulators to alter rules or be lenient in enforcing those rules.”103 Braithwaite and Makkai 
made the concept of “capture” more nuanced by breaking it into three related behaviors – 
sympathy to industry (implying excessive sympathy), identification with industry’s 
interest, and (unduly) lax enforcement.104 
Another definition emphasizes the consequences, suggesting that captured 
regulatory agencies are  
                                                 
101 STEVEN P.  CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY 
GOVERNMENT (2007); JOEL HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, 
BUREAUCRACY (1986). 
102 DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND 
POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001); COSMO GRAHAM, REGULATING PUBLIC 
UTILITIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH (2000). 
103 Craig W. Thomas et al., Special Interest Capture of Regulatory Agencies: A Ten-Year Analysis of Voting 
Behavior on Regional Fishery Management Councils, 38 POL’Y STUDIES J. 447, 448 (2010). There is room 
in the literature for an article that identifies different types of behavior that fall under the definition of 
capture and addresses each of them separately. That is not this article. As the literature review here 
demonstrates, there is scholarship focusing on a specific type of capture, such as the revolving door (see 
Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REVIEW OF ECON. POL’Y 203, 214-
215 (2006), for a review of the literature). But much of the literature talks in much more general terms. 
MAKKAI & BRAITHEWAITE; AYRES & BRAITHWAITE; STEVEN P.  CROLEY, Regulation and Public Interests: 
the Possibility of Good Regulatory Government (2007); MALCOLM K. SPARROW, The Regulatory Craft: 
Controlling Risks, Solving Problems, and Managing Compliance (2000). 
104 T. Makkai & John Braithewaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory 
Capture, 12 J. OF PUB. POL’Y 61, 64-67 (1992). 
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…persistently serving the interests of regulated industries to the 
neglect or harm of more general, or ‘public’, interests… The 
accusation implies excessive regulated industry influence on 
regulatory agencies.105  
The first part of this definition is a little more problematic, since a decision can 
serve the interests of the regulated industry and still be in the public interest, or serve the 
interests of the regulated industry but not be the result of excessive influence.106 
In this case, the URF decision fits both definitions. The URF decision did indeed 
do what the ILECs (but not the CLECs) wanted – provide price flexibility. And it heavily 
cited their submissions. CPUC officials highlighted the substantial amount of data 
submitted by the utilities, focusing especially on the intensive report submitted by Debra 
Aron, Verizon’s expert, a report which drew on national studies as well as California-
level data Verizon submitted. But once again, being convinced by the data the utilities 
submitted – and rejecting the detailed reports of consumer organizations – does not by 
itself indicate regulatory capture.107 At the end of the day, the CPUC was faced with two 
sets of diametrically opposed briefs and analyses and had to accept one. The recent Tobin 
project highlighted how problematic it is to actually prove capture,108 and how even a 
situation that can be seen as classic capture – like the behavior of the Mineral 
Management Service, which waived the requirement of Environmental Impact 
Statements for many deep water oil drilling projects – may be due to something else.109 
The commission initiated the URF decision, and commission members discussed 
it for several years before passing it.110 It was strongly supported by the Communications 
Division staff, the same staff that worked on the LifeLine decision in which consumer 
organizations won on many of the issues. The same Communications Division engaged 
in enforcement against industry in other contexts, for example, in relation to verification 
                                                 
105 PAUL J.  QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (1981). 
106 Daniel P. Carpenter, Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, 
Learning Regulator, 98 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 613 (2004). 
107 Id.  
108 Daniel P. Carpenter & David Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST 
INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel P. Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2014). 
109 Christopher Carrigan, Minerals Management Service and Deepwater Horizon: What Role 
Should Capture Play?, See id. at  239-297 
110 See infra Part IV.2.  
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of LifeLine eligibility. As described in the next section, the Communications Division 
promoted verification for a time.  
The Commission did evince a belief that the market can regulate the ILECs. After 
all, the decision was based on the existence of competition in the market and an 
underlying assumption that such competition will control the behavior of the ILECs and 
prevent abuses. But a pro-market philosophy – held by many people, in or out of 
regulatory agencies – is not capture. 111 
Representatives of consumer organizations saw the decision as a result of a pro-
market ideology, rather than direct influence by industry. A consumer organization 
interviewee also explained that “the Communications Division is captive not necessarily 
by industry but by an ideology. My perspective on [the] role of divisions is that they also 
should be objective, without particular ideology. [The Communications Division] has 
consistently been very much for free market, competition will save the world, we don’t 
need regulation. This is a myopic view, not supported by facts.”112 This is an ideological 
divergence of views—whether the market work in this context—but it is not capture.  
Commissioner Chong, the assigned commissioner who, by many accounts, had a 
strong influence on the process (see the next section), was criticized for her “pro-market 
views”,113 but several expressly said they do not see her as actually captured by industry, 
or even sympathetic to a specific company or group of companies: she simply, according 
to them, sincerely believes in the market.114 
                                                 
111 B. GUY PETERS, THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING (2001) (describing the power of market ideology in 
today’s governance); see also THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999) (justifying 
market ideologies); Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From 
Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 369 (2009); 
Alexander Kouzmin, Market Fundamentalism, Delusions and Epistemic Failures in Policy and 
Administration, 1 ASIA-PACIFIC J. OF BUS. ADMIN. 23 (2009). But see D. Joseph Stiglitz, Moving Beyond 
Market Fundamentalism to a More Balanced Economy, 80 ANNALS OF PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 345 
(2009) (providing criticism). What this should suggest is that markets are subject to passionate debates 
beyond this specific case study, and trying to link a belief in the free market with regulatory capture is 
problematic. As explained in the text, that is not what consumer organizations are saying here.  
112 Interviews, consumer rights advocates. 
113 Interviews, consumer rights advocates.  
114 Id. One interviewee suggested that her post-CPUC employment with Comcast is indicative of her 
preferences. Even that interviewee, however, did not suggest undue influence on her decision.  
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As Dan Carpenter points out, it is often hard to distinguish between a captured 
regulator and one who sincerely believes the position supported by industry is 
preferable.115 The best evidence I have here—including the consistent views of the 
CPUC’s communications described in the next section—suggests sincere belief in the 
rightness of the policy due to belief in the market (and not necessarily sympathy to any 
specific company or group of companies) rather than capture. 
B.  ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER 
Several consumer organizations expressed the view that the difference between 
the decisions was the result of the identity of the assigned commissioner. Basically, the 
argument was that Commissioner Rachel Chong was pro-market and promoted the 
utilities interests, and Commissioner Dian Grueneich was the “consumers’ 
commissioner” and took a more balanced view.116 
In a CPUC rulemaking, the assigned commissioner is, by definition, the leader of 
the process. Even though, as emphasized by CPUC officials, this was a unanimous 
decision of all five commissioners,117 when dealing with a strong personality such as that 
of Commissioner Chong, it is unrealistic to ignore her influence on the proceeding. 
Commissioner Rachel Chong’s professional background includes working for several 
smaller (competitor) telecommunications carriers and serving on the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC). She broke ground by becoming a 
telecommunications lawyer when there were very few women in the field and by being 
the first Asian American to serve on the CPUC. By all accounts,118 she has a powerful 
personality, sharp mind, and extensive knowledge in telecommunications. Her admirers 
describe her as “…very knowledgeable and smart.  Knows history and context,”119 and as 
generally impressive.120 Opponents see her as excessively harsh and domineering: “she 
                                                 
115 Carpenter, supra note 102. 
116 This is a paraphrasing of sentiments voiced by TURN, DRA, and Melissa Kasnitz, but I think it fairly 
reflects those sentiments. In her concurrence to the LifeLine Decision, Commissioner Grueneich said: “A 
top priority of my office has been protecting customers—especially at risk customers.” LifeLine Decision, 
supra note 30, at 158).  
117 Interviews, CPUC Officials.  
118 I.e. all accounts I collected for the purpose of writing this paper. Thank you, Frederick Reiss, for making 
sure I add this qualification.  
119 Interview, CPUC. 
120 Interview, CPUC; Interview, Cox.  
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was a bulldog. Threatened people, browbeat people, mean to the staff;”121 “[she was] 
very aggressive, a strong personality. Would scream at people.”122 
In either case, she was not the kind of person to be only a nominal leader, and she 
clearly participated heavily in the decision-making. One CPUC official described her 
involvement in these terms: 
It was her decision. She read everything. She worked like a legal 
editor. Wanted every argument addressed. She made sure the 
decision was heavily footnoted, tied to the record. It was her 
editorial choice – she was very involved. Copy edited the whole 
thing.123 
The decision was voted on by the other commissioners, all experienced in many 
areas (though not necessarily in utilities), but it was written under the guidance of 
Commissioner Chong. An interviewee convincingly suggested the other commissioners 
deferred to Commissioner Chong’s known expertise in telecommunications.124 
People did not describe the same level of involvement from Commissioner 
Grueneich, but the second decision was as much Grueneich’s decision as the URF was 
Chong’s.  
However, a focus on the commissioner’s personality as the leading factor in the 
URF decision ignores the fact that this decision was part of a long saga of development in 
telecommunications regulation. A CPUC official explained that:  
The URF and 2010 LifeLine decisions reflect an evolution of 
[Communications] policy that reflects changing regulations to 
accommodate evolving competitive market conditions. That 
evolution primarily starts with the New Regulatory Framework 
(NRF) decisions 88-09-059 and 89-10-031 that established the 
structure, and 89-12-048 that adopted a start-up revenue 
requirement. 
The Implementation Rate Design (IRD) decision 94-09-065 
permitted toll competition, rate decreases and basic service rate 
                                                 
121 Interview under conditions of confidentiality.  
122 Interview, TURN.  
123 Interview, CPUC.  
124 Interview, DRA.  
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increase [sic]. This formula of basic rate rebalancing is a [sic] 
outgrowth of decreasing toll revenues. The IRD cost of stand 
alone basic service was much greater than the adopted rates. The 
New Regulatory Framework would not protect rates from going 
up if revenues continued to decline. 
Local competition was granted in 1996 with decision 96-02-072.  
It is my view that the continual decrease in toll, ancillary services 
and basic service lines would in a NRF regulatory environment 
potentially result in large basic service rate increases. The URF 
decision avoids such further rate rebalancing proceedings by 
declaring the residential telephone market competitive. Even if 
the URF decision did not cite competitive market specifics as 
TURN would like, the common knowledge of industry trends 
were [sic] evident.125 
An interviewee asked about this confirmed that URF was, indeed, a culmination 
of a long process of streamlining the regulatory framework and removing controls 
supported (or even driven by) the communications division of the CPUC.126 This 
important role of the staff fits with previous studies of utility regulators.127 
Interviewees place the beginning of the real push towards what became the 
Uniform Regulatory Framework at Commissioner’s Susan Kennedy’s tenure on the 
CPUC. Commissioner Kennedy expressed the need for deregulation in multiple speeches. 
For example, in 2004, two years before Commissioner Chong joined the CPUC, in a 
speech to the Telecommunications Association, an organization of operators, then-
Commissioner Kennedy laid out the principles that would later be included in URF. 
While highlighting the need for preserving certain social programs,128 she suggested that 
“the current intercarrier compensation system must be scrapped and replaced with 
something more simple and rational.” She also urged that “regulators should not be 
wasting one more minute on enforcing anachronistic regulations that no longer serve any 
                                                 
125 Email to author by CPUC official.  
126 The official cited was the first to mention this story, and previous interviewees were not asked about it.  
127 Gormley, supra note 42. 
128 Stating that they must include a broad-based system of support for high cost areas, lifeline service, and 
access for the disabled. Susan P. Kennedy, “You Say You Want A Revolution?”, Remarks to California 
Telephone Association, Monterey, California, February 17, 2004 (on file with author). 
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useful purpose…regulators should approach the entire panoply of existing 
telecommunication regulation from a blank slate.… No regulation should be adopted 
unless it meets a threshold question: “Is this really necessary?”129  
According to interviewees, the issue had been on the table for a while but there 
were always more pressing things to do. Commissioner Kennedy pushed the issue 
forward – she was described by one interviewee as “a go-getter”130 and by another as 
“brilliant, the most intellectual of commissioners”.131 
Commissioner Kennedy left the CPUC in December 2005 to become chief of staff 
to Governor Schwarzenegger and – according to one interviewee, due to Commissioner 
Kennedy’s influence132 -- Commissioner Chong was appointed for three years to 
complete the term.  
What this discussion suggests is that, while Commissioner Chong was certainly 
on board with the goals of the URF decision and firmly believed in the need to radically 
move away from the previous regulatory framework, the decision was strongly supported 
and promoted by the CPUC’s staff in the Communications Division and was the result of 
a process over time and cannot be attributed only to Commissioner Chong’s views. That 
is not to discount Commissioner Chong’s powerful influence over the process and the 
content of the final decision, but the end result, while partly attributable to her support of 
deregulating prices, was not solely because of her personal position.  
C.  TYPE OF ISSUE  
Although the literature on this topic is limited, different agencies can and do act 
differently on different issues.133 That is because different issues vary in the level of 
technological complexity they require and the level of conflict they generate.134 This 
article suggests that in these decisions, at least, agencies also approached the two issues 
with different expectations as to the importance of participation of consumer groups.   
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 Interview, AT&T. 
131 Interview, CPUC.  
132 Interview, CPUC. 
133 Gormley, supra note 39; Dorit Reiss, Agency Accountability Strategies After Liberalization: Universal 
Service in the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden, 31 L. & POL’Y 111 (2009). 
134 Gormley, supra note 39; Reiss, supra note 133.   
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In the two decisions in question here, expertise was more at issue in the URF 
decision. That decision required sophisticated understanding of the telecommunications 
market and its regulatory framework as well as economic concepts. Groups without the 
ability to use the language of efficiency were at a disadvantage.135 There were, however, 
at least two groups with considerable sophistication and knowledge of utility matters 
speaking on the consumer side – TURN and DRA. They both provided extensive briefs. 
It was not, therefore, just their ability to speak to the matter. 
The LifeLine decision was conducted in less economic terms. The discussion was 
about how to protect consumers. The more professional aspect was conducting the 
affordability study, and that was finished at the beginning of the process. And here, too, 
the same sophisticated consumer groups – and others – participated. 
So in theory, the difference in expertise should not have affected the proceeding. 
But it did. Examining the process suggests the level of expertise affected the CPUC’s 
view of consumer groups’ submissions – but not in the way Gormley suggests, under 
which consumer groups could not participate in high-expertise areas because of their lack 
of resources and specialization. It seems that expertise worked the other way. In the URF 
decision, the consumer groups were treated as another party, and a party with an agenda, 
at that: the opposition to the initial goal of the proceeding. But in the LifeLine decision 
they were seen as an expert group on consumer issues. Since the goal of the LifeLine 
program is to protect vulnerable consumers, and since the consumer organizations—and 
especially those focusing on more vulnerable groups, like DisabRA and Greenlining—
have substantial knowledge about the problems and issues of those groups and direct 
access to their voices, their comments were taken extremely seriously. The CPUC openly 
acknowledged that these groups suggested some things that regulators had not thought of, 
and influenced some of their decisions. This is confirmed by comparing the initial 
proposals, the briefs and the final proposals. For example, the CPUC directly attributed 
its decision to freeze LifeLine rates at their then-current levels to submissions by 
                                                 
135 See generally BRONWEN MORGAN, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE SHADOW OF COMPETITION: THE 
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS OF REGULATORY JUSTIFICATION (2003) (theorizing that knowing how to speak 
the language of economic rationality is critical to interest groups that want to participate in administrative 
policy making).  
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DisabRA and Greenlining.136 The commission also attributed to those groups the decision 
to allow carriers to change the rates only once a year.137 
The other aspect of Gormley’s typology, the level of conflict, also actually 
worked here the other way from his analysis: Gormley expected conflict to be 
particularly high around LifeLine issues, since that pits certain groups of consumers 
against others.138 However, the tension between consumer groups was actually higher in 
the URF decision. Consumer groups in the URF decision worried that there were certain 
groups of consumers who would be disproportionally harmed by the decision: those 
dependent on basic residential service and unable to take advantage of alternatives or 
bundles. In contrast, in the LifeLine decision in question, eligibility questions had already 
been determined. The existence of the program had already been settled, the discussion 
around what form the subsidy would take had already occurred and, as important as it 
was, it was less controversial than whether there should be a program and who should be 
eligible. Therefore, the level of conflict was higher in URF.  
Again, if seen through the lenses of expectations, the level of conflict has a 
different meaning. The focus in addressing conflict here is, again, on the role of the 
agency in facilitating the process and promoting a more or less adversarial one. The 
CPUC expected Consumer Advocates – TURN, DisabRA, and so on -- to oppose its 
position on the URF. As mentioned above, Commissioner Kennedy expressed support for 
deregulation in 2005. The process was the continuing of a trend, and the direction was 
suggested early on. The organizations expressed their views – opposing price 
deregulation – early in the process. This open opposition made the CPUC less receptive 
to their positions (though not less attentive – as seen by the fact that the CPUC addressed 
their positions in its detailed decision). It expected two contrasting positions, and 
although it worked to get all the parties’ positions clarified and to get them to work 
together, it anticipated and accepted an adversarial process. In contrast, in relation to 
LifeLine, the CPUC, as explained, expected the consumer organizations to make a 
valuable contribution – and got what it expected.  
 
                                                 
136 Intervenor Compensations. Supra note 100. 
137 Id.  
138 Gormley, supra note 39. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This article highlights the important role of agency members and their points of 
view on the regulatory process and regulatory outcomes. It demonstrates two types of 
difficulties relating to the subject matter: the challenges in designing an appropriately 
open and yet efficient administrative process, and the challenges of identifying impact 
and its connection to a certain result in an administrative proceeding. The CPUC’s 
process provided multiple access points and ample opportunities for the parties to submit 
written views. Nonetheless, in the URF proceeding, it was criticized as having several 
procedural problems. Some of the criticisms stem from dissatisfaction with the result, and 
suggestions this was partly due to faulty process; nonetheless, several stakeholders 
passionately criticized the problem and strongly believed it did not provide sufficient 
opportunity to be heard and to challenge the other side’s views. The CPUC was aware of 
potential criticisms of its decision not to have additional hearings, but decided to 
prioritize a rapid process over one that provided the parties the hearings they sought, 
because they believed that delay would be harmful to the participants in the market and 
that the issues could be handled through written submissions.  
In terms of impact, a simple examination of which parties’ positions were 
accepted would lead the reader to think of the URF decision as a situation of substantial 
influence by the utilities, or even regulatory capture. But a closer examination of the 
process of making the decision suggests that the reasons behind it were different. A 
certain world philosophy – a belief in the effectiveness of competitive markets to control 
corporate behavior, and a view of the telecommunications market as fostering 
competition that will do so – affected the result. It was not simply a product of the 
regulator doing what the utilities wanted. Instead, it was the result of a view developed 
over a long time by the professional staff and accepted by one commissioner, then held 
by another.  
Two insights can be derived from this: the importance of the agency’s staff, and 
the need for a long term, nuanced study of regulation. Regulation is a long-term process 
with many repeat players interacting again and again. It is best understood in context.  
 
* * * 
